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Abstract: According to the theory of ―Political Business Cycles (PBC)‖, politicians prefer to 
pursue opportunistic policies in order to increase their chance of election. For this reason, they 
apply expansionary policies before the elections. Hence, they start to do this by increasing public 
expenditures. There is an increase in the indicators of money parallel to the increase in public 
expenditures. In this study it is examined that whether there have been appropriate developments 
in terms of PBC theory during the elections of six congressmen in the period after 1980. In order 
to determine the effect of PBC ―the traditional opportunistic model‖ from Nordhaus is used to test 
the PBC effect. ―The opportunistic model‖ from Nordhaus is tested through the autoregressive 
analysis method which is used by Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1991,1992) in their studies for the 
OECD countries and industrial countries. The results obtained as a result of the empirical analysis 
support the PBC theory.  
 
 
Introduction 
  
The history of economics is the history of debates between the ones who claim that the government 
intervention is necessary and who claim that it is unnecessary.  In the framework of these debates, applications of 
both of these approaches are observed due to the economic conditions of each period. However, there is a fact which 
should be accepted that every day the state intervenes in the economic life with different reasons and through various 
legal and institutional regulations. If the economists are not able to put their developed theories into the application, 
then they just do brain gymnastic. Thus, this situation is seemed during many years and this distinction between 
economics and politics give the idea to the politicians that they can arrange the economic life according to their own 
vote calculations. This idea becomes widespread along with the economists isolate themselves from the legal and 
institutional structure of the society (SavaĢ, 1997). Especially in the developing countries with a less institutional and 
legal structure, the public share in the economy is more than others. Through the political instabilities it is 
understood that the financial issues are not the only reason of this situation.  In the beginning the state is seem as 
maintaining the social order and it is associated with the Leviathan which is a superhuman being, whereas later it is 
seen that the state is transformed to a monster that gives harm to its environment. Especially, after the Second World 
War the rapid increase in the contribution of state in the economic life is defined as a very big danger (Erim, 2007). 
If being away from the economic life is impossible for the state, at least there should be a limit of this contribution. 
Politics and political institutions should be accepted as endogenous rather than exogenous in the economic theories. 
After the long historical development process from this view, the Political Economic Theory (PET) is developed.   
According to the PBC theory economy is manipulated by policy makers during the electoral periods since 
politicians behave with political interest mostly in these periods. If the politicians are not restricted enough with the 
laws in terms of their usage of economic policy tools, they prefer to pursue opportunistic policies instead of policies 
for the interest of the public. In order to affect electorates, they mostly increase public expenditures. The financing of 
the increased public expenditures is funded through increasing the money supply instead of increasing taxes since 
taxes are not pleased by the electorates (Azgün, 2006). In this study, it is examined that whether the PBC has an 
effect on the money variables of public expenditures, money supply and money in circulation during the general 
elections of six congressmen in the period after 1980 in Turkey. ―The traditional opportunistic model‖ of Nordhaus 
is used in order to test the effect of PBC. ―The opportunistic model‖ from Nordhaus is tested through the 
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autoregressive analysis method which is used by Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1991, 1992) in their studies for the 
OECD countries and industrial countries. 
 
Political Business Cycles Models 
 
The concept of Political Business Cycles is firstly used by Nordhaus. According to Nordhaus, by aiming 
vote maximization politicians pursue expansionary policies before the elections in order to boost the economy 
whereas they pursue contractionary policies after the elections in order to remove the effects of these expansionary 
policies. Therefore, a cycle occurs in economy due to the electoral periods (Nordhaus, 1975). 
When the studies related with Political Business Cycles is examined it is observed that the literature 
regarding to this issue is developed on two cycles. The first one is ―traditional model‖ that is considered in two 
categories and the first of these is the opportunistic model developed by Nordhaus and the second one is the 
partisanship model developed later by Hibbs (Hibbs, 1977). According to opportunistic model, politicians do not 
have partisan objectives, they just appeal all kinds of manipulations in order to win elections. According to 
partisanship model, politicians try to gain votes of their own electoral group by implementing ideological policies. 
Secondly, in the framework of ―rational expectations theory‖ which is popular in 1980s, the PBC theory has been 
developed as a ―modern approach‖. With the acceptance of rational expectations theory, the PBC theory is criticized 
at the beginning.  However, as a result of the empirical studies positive findings are obtained regarding to that the 
PBC theory can still be explanatory even though the rational expectations theory is valid. According to the modern 
PBC theory, because of the asymmetric information between the governments and citizens governments continue to 
exhibit opportunistic or partisanship behaviors.   
 
Methodology 
 
In this study, in order to determine whether the politicians pursue opportunistic policies or not in the 
electoral periods, the autoregressive analysis method is used which is applied by Alesina, Cohen and Roubini 
(1991,1992) in their studies for the OECD countries and industrial countries (Alesina, 1991).  The autoregressive 
models are preferred instead of the structural models regarding each macroeconomic indicator which is due to the 
reason that by testing each variable with the same model it is aimed to decrease the probability of difference that can 
be arisen from modeling error in the determination of the effect of electoral periods. Furthermore, in the literature it 
is emphasized that structural models are mainly valid in the developed countries with strong economy whereas their 
validity is questionable in the less developed and developing countries with fragile economic system (Özkan, 2005). 
General notation of the autoregressive model which is used in this study is as in the following: 
  Yt = α0 + α1 Yt-1+ α2 Yt-2+……+ αn Yt-n+PBCDUMMY + εt     (1) 
Here, Yt represents each macroeconomic indicator. PBCDUMMY is the dummy variable that indicates the 
dynamic implications of the theory of political business cycles. PBCDUMMY is defined as ―1‖ for the election 
quarter and three quarters before the election, and defined as ―0‖ for other periods. εt represents the error terms. 
The lagged values of autoregressive model is determined through the ―from general to special theory‖. The 
stability of series is examined through the ADF unit root test (Dickey and Fuller, 1990). The Jarque-Bera(JB) test is 
used in order to test whether the normality assumption, which is one of the necessary assumptions to perform 
autoregression analysis, is satisfied or not (Bera and Jarque, 1981). After these models are tested, through the 
Breusch Godfrey (LM) test it is checked whether there is an autocorrelation between the error terms or not (Godfrey, 
1988). For error terms having constant variance is another necessary condition for autoregression analysis. The 
ARCH LM test is used in order to determine whether the error terms have constant variance or not.   
 
Test Results 
Unit Root Analyses Result 
 
 When the graphic of public expenditures series in real terms is examined, seasonal effects are observed in the series. It 
is observed that the coefficients are significant in the regression analysis which is performed with the seasonal dummy variables. 
The seasonality effects are removed from the series and the stability of the series is checked with the ADF test. As seen on Table 
1, the real public expenditures series which does not include seasonal effects is not stable as its degree. It is seen that the yearly 
percentage change of series is stable with 0.05% significance level according to the ADF model which has a constant term and 
trend.  
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Figure 1: Degree of Public Expenditures and Its Yearly Percentage Change Graphics 
 
When the graphic of public expenditures series in real terms is examined, seasonal effects are observed in 
the series. It is observed that the coefficients are significant in the regression analysis which is performed with the 
seasonal dummy variables. The seasonality effects are removed from the series and the stability of the series is 
checked with the ADF test. As seen on Table 1, the real public expenditures series which does not include seasonal 
effects is not stable as its degree. It is seen that the yearly percentage change of series is stable with 0.05% 
significance level according to the ADF model which has a constant term and trend.  
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Figure 2: Degree of Real M1 and Its Yearly Percentage Change Graphics 
 
When the graphic of Real M1 series is examined, at first it is observed that the series is not stable. 
Furthermore, it appears that there can also be seasonal effect. It is seen that the coefficients are significant as a result 
of the regression analysis done with the seasonal dummy variables. However, when the yearly percentage change is 
considered the seasonality effect disappears. Furthermore, when Table 1 is examined it is seen that while the real M1 
series is not stable, the percentage change is stable in all ADF models in terms of various significance levels.   
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Figure 3: Degree of Real Money in Circulation and Its Yearly Percentage Change Graphics 
 
2
nd 
 International Symposium on Sustainable Development, June 8-9 2010, Sarajevo 
 474 
When the graphic of real money in circulation is examined, it is understood that the series is not stable, 
however it is not certainly understood whether there is a seasonal effect or not. As a result of the regression analysis 
done with the seasonal dummy variables it is seen that the coefficients are insignificant, therefore it is understood 
that there is no seasonality effect. When the results of the unit root test is examined, it is observed that the series of 
real money in circulation is not stable in degree of level whereas the percentage change is stable in all ADF models 
in terms of various significance levels.   
The results of ADF unit root test, which is performed to determine the stability structures of series, are 
shown on Table 1.  
 
  
with constant 
term  Lag. 
constant term 
and trend Lag. 
without constant 
term and trend Lag. 
Public expenditures -2,04 3 -1,47 3 -0,91 4 
Public expenditures % -1,80 8 -3,79
**
 3 -0,76 4 
M1 0,03 4 -1,00 4 0,98 4 
M1% -2,70
***
 4 -4,08
*
 7 -2,02
**
 8 
Money in circulation 1,62 6 0,37 6 2,12 6 
Money in circulation % -2,85
***
 4 -4,90
*
 3 -2,44
**
 4 
Kritical values, 
%1    -3,51  -4,06  -2,59  
%5    -2,89  -3,46  -1,94  
%10   -2,58  -3,15  -1,61  
Table 1: ADF Test Results 
 
Autoregressive Model Analyses Results 
 
The summary of statistical values for autoregressive model examining public expenditures, money supply 
and money in circulation is shown on Table 2. The autoregressive models which are estimated by lagged values are 
as in the following: 
 Pub.Expen. =  2,53+ 13,6 Pub.Expen. (-2) + 0,18 Pub.Expen. (-4) + 0,39 PBCdummy 
 (0,00)  (0,03)   (0,08)      (0,00) 
 
M1  = 7,47  +0,79 M1(-1)  +0,42 M1(-5) + 0,21 M1(-7)  – 0,22 M1(-8)  +8,22PBCdummy 
(0.05) (0.00) (0,01)  (0,00)  (0,04)  (0,03)  (0,06) 
 
M.Cir. =  2,95+ 0,49 M.Cir.(-1) + 0,20 M.Cir.(-2) - 0,33 M.Cir.(-4) + 26 M.Cir.(-5) + 11,79 PBCdummy 
 (0,41)  (0,00)  (0,07)  (0,00)   (0,01)   (0,00) 
 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent 
Varieble 
Public 
Harcamaları 
Money Supply Money Circulation 
αi t ist. t pro αi t ist. t ol. αi t ist. t prob 
PBC 
Dummy 
13,6 
**
 
2,17 0,03 8,22 
***
 
1,87 0,06 11,79
*
 3,07 0,00 
R
2
 0,25 0,62 0,44 
DW 2,07 2,07 2,05 
F probably 0,00 0,00 0,00 
JB 47,47 (0.00) 1,40 (0,49) 17,10 (0,00) 
LM 0,85 (0,47) 0,53(0,58) 0,56(0,56) 
ARCH 0,92 (0,40) 0,30(0,73) 1,27(0,27) 
Table 2: Autoregressive Analyses Results 
 
According to the regression estimate results on Table 2, it is observed that there is no autocorrelation and 
changing variance problems in the LM and ARCH tests. Even the normality assumption is not satisfied in the model 
regarding money supply since the number of observation (80) is sufficient enough and since there is no changing 
variance problem the regression is highly confidential.   
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When coefficient estimate results regarding to the examined variables are concerned, it is seen that 
PBCDummy coefficient is positive and significant as appropriate to the theory. This acquired result confirms the 
argument of the PBC theory that when the politicians try to affect the electorates they mostly use the ―public 
expenditures‖ as fiscal policy tool. As a result of the increase in public expenditures there is an increase in money 
supply and money in circulation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Manipulating the macroeconomic policies in the direction of politic interests is one of the significant 
problems of Turkish economy as in the economies of many countries. In order to come to power and to establish 
government, politicians do not avoid using macroeconomic policies as instruments. In this study it is aimed to 
determine whether politicians have opportunistic behavior or not. Therefore, it is analyzed that being appropriate to 
the PBC theory whether there is a significant change in policy instrument variables such as public expenditures, 
money supply and money in circulation during the electoral periods. When the obtained results are examined it is 
observed that the election dummy variable regarding public expenditures, money supply and money in circulation is 
positive and statistically significant which is appropriate to the theory. These findings assert that governments pursue 
opportunistic policies in electoral periods in Turkey.  
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